Reactor power plant safety is assured through a combination of engineered barriers to radiation release (e.g., reactor containment) in combination with active reactor safety systems to shut the reactor down and remove decay heat. While not specifically identified as safety systems, the control systems responsible for continuous operation of plant subsystems are the first line of defense for mitigating radiation releases and for plant protection.
Introduction
Reactor power-plant safety is ensured through a combination of engineered barriers to radiation release (e.g., reactor containment) in combination with active reactor safety systems that shut down the reactor and remove decay heat. In this sense full authority for active reactor protection is placed upon reactor safety systems. While not specifically identifiedtas safety systems, the control systems responsible for continuous operation of plant subsystems are the first line of defense for mitigating radiation releases and for plant protection, i.e., the first-line defense for active safety control is excluded from any safety considerations.
"Inherently safe" reactors take advantage of passivesystem features for decay-heat removal and reactorshutdown functions normally assigned to active reactor safety systems. The advent of these reactors may permit restructuring of the present control-system design strategy. This restructuring is based on the fact that authority for protection against unlikely accidents is, as much as practical, placed upon the passive features of the system instead of the traditional placement upon plant pr6tettion systems (PPS). Consequently, the reactor control may be simplified, allowing the reliability of control systems to be improved and more easily defended. An inherently safe reactor is one which does not require active safety systems for decay-heat removal or reactor shutdown. While the ideal may not be fully attained, it can be approached by many designs currently being proposed. The control strategy for an inherently safe reactor must recognize the shifting of safety responsibility from the reactorshutdown system to the passive features of the reactor system and should take full advantage of this change in safety-design requirements. As an extension of this realization, the control system, assuming an improvement in reliability, could conceivably satisfy both operating and safety requirements. One would presumably retain a reactor safety system, but its functions could be simplified and its actions limited to the extreme events.
The subject of this paper is the design impact of placing upon the control system the authority for protection against anticipated events. Demonstrating the feasibility of such a design strategy could lead to overall improvements in power plant reliability, availability, and safety.
Control Strategy for Inherently Safe Reactors Figure 1 depicts the functional hierarchy for a reactor control system. For a pressurized water reactor (PWR) design, active response of the control system provides the first line of defense against a transient that could exceed a power to flow ratio of one. The PPS provides an ultra-reliable final defense for this controllable excursion. The PPS is also responsible for detecting reactor-system failures and initiating protective action §s (e.g., against earthquake or loss of coolant). The PPS attains ultra-reliability via design constraints such as diversity and the use of demonstrably reliable components. Therefore, the control of PWRs depends initially upon the continuous and the man-machine control loops to mitigate transients by maintaining plant parameters within operational bounds. The PPS provides backup control action when these bounds are exceeded. The action taken by the PPS is plant shutdown which has two undesirable aspects: (1) significant thermal transients and (2) unavailability of the plant during the period between analysis of the shutdown and approach to power.
As indicated above, inherently safe reactors allow designers to rethink the role of the PPS with respect to the overall reactor-control system. The PPS function of ultra-reliable protection against power-toflow (P/F) excursions will be ultimately placed upon the reactor system. The remaining function of diversely providing P/F protection could be placed upon the continuous control loops which traditionally have authority for active mitigation of P/F excursions. The design challenges associated with elevating the continuous control loop to safety-system requirements are primarily associated with certification of reliability. As noted in Table 1 , safety systems (e.g., PPSs) have a high cost per channel. This cost is associated with the manpower expended in verification and validation (V&V) of the design. As the continuous control loops are more complex, V&V of their design could be expected to become more expensive. It is the intent of this paper to explore the design problems associated with ultra-reliable control loops and compare those with the advantages of adopting the suggested strategic change in control philosophy. Table 1 establishes a perspective for the relative design constraints for the four levels of a nuclear power plant control system. Safety systems must be ultra-reliable, respond rapidly, and have full authority for protection. In contrast, a continuous control loop is moderately reliable and can be overridden by an operator. However, a continuous control loop could be considered analogous to an expert system, e.g., a control system detects differences between the process and the desired setpoint and takes action to bring the process within proper bounds. Analysis of the proposed inherently safe reactor designs suggests that the response time for protective actions should be on the order of minutes versus that of seconds for existing LWR designs. Power cutbacks, rather than reactor shutdown, could become the predominate control action when P/F anomolies are sensed. During the controlled cutback, analysis of the cause of the anomoly could be performed and, should the situation be one that is correctable, remedied without shutdown. The benefits are twofold: (1) power continuity and (2) Figure 1 depicts the functional hierarchy for a reactor control system which is comprised of the PPS, the continuous control loops, the man/machine control and the administrative control system. Each of the functional levels has a relative degree of expertise as listed in Table 1 . The above analogy, that a continuous control system was similar to an expert system combined with the concept that P/F anomolies be analyzed, suggest the application of computers for the postulated control strategy.
The following section investigates the design concerns associated with ultra-reliable computers. which are traceable to design errors in the application of plant computers at operating nuclear plants. This report highlights the difficulty that designers and regulators are experiencing in applying computers to reactor shutdown systems (RSSs). The difficulty arises from the complex nature of computer-based systems and of reliability analyses for the design. Analysis of reactor safety systems requires detailed qualitative and quiantitative examination of the design, e.g., fault-trees, failure modes and effects, Markhov, etc. The complex nature of computer-based systems increases the manpower requirements for similar analyses.
A form of software analysis which could be considered analogous to that required for RSSs is a formal proof of correctness (POC). A formal POC is an extremely rigorous proof of the properties of the software and claims to be entirely exhaustive in approach. There are two methods of performing a formal POC: (1) an analytical process or (2) testing. The analytical process suffers the limitation that its execuition is dependent upon the atnalyst and is therefore subject to human error. The testing process involves duplicating every error (both software and hardware induced) for every execution path. This type of testing may take tens of thousands of hours to perform and is also subject to human frailities. Reference 4 outlines a practical approach that combines both testing and POC. The underlying theory is that both processes are incomplete, but that a testing program based upon confirmation of the assumptions and assertions inherent in the POC would provide validation of the analytical POC without the manpower burden inherent in a testbased POC. This theory will form the basis of design verification for the software and hardware components of the fault-tolerant flow-trip demonstration. There are various design approaches to FTCs. These approaches may also be subdivided by intended market. This discussion will focus upon designs that are specific to on-line, real-time plant control faulttolerant applications. The discussion will also be limited to highly reliable systems from the standpoint of fault-tolerance to internal failures; i.e., the computer must be demonstrated to consistently produce the desired output during the presence of single failures.
Within this restricted context, there are two broad classifications of FTCs. These are softwareimplemented fault-tolerance (SIFT) and hardwareimplemented fault-tolerant (HIFT). A SIFT computer requires between 5% and 20% of the computatiorn capability of the processors to implement fault tolerance. An additional design penalty occurs during design verification. Verification is a very manpowerintensive effort, and software verification is compounded by the complex interaction between software and hardware. Therefore, the SIFT design compounds the verification effort in that not only must the applications software be verified but software necessary for fault-tolerant operation must also be verified. Based upon the expertise available within the present project, this additional effort would result in a significant extension to the schedule.
For reasons of superior performance and reduced software-verification effort, the hardware implementatioIn of fault tolerance will be used for the computer component of the FT2 phase. Ihis method will allow parametric analysis of the flow model. with respect to plant upsets. The second method wi11. be to install the model in a test environment where it will use actual plant signals, and the test will duplicate the final installation. The test will be monitored to verify accurate flow-trip response.
A final attribute of the safety argument beirng proposed for acceptance of the fault-tolerant flow trip project is that of determination of the safety boundary both in the hardware and software environments. The design of the software for the recommended design is dependent upon the operation of a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). The SPRT is a statistically based test of sensor information, which incorporates the predicted failure distribuition of the sensor. The output of the SPRT is ouie of three hypotheses: (1) the senisor is correct, (2) the sensor is incorrect, or (3) additional data must be gathered. The intent is that the SPRT be the heart of the flow trip, i.e., the SPRT is the functional element of the design that must perform infallibly. The SPRT in this design might be considered as the couniterpart of a coincidence circuit in analog-safety-system designs. The software and hardware necessary for infallible operation of the SPRT must be demonstrated to be reliable and must therefore be subjected to the formal analysis described above. Because the analytical technology is still under developmeInt, the amounit of software and hardware that must be analyzed has been kept to a minimum for this demonstration.
